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Japan’s Foreign Economic Policy Strategies and Economic Performance 





The economic rise of Japan in the 1980s was underpinned by a commitment to catching up 
through domestic reform and accommodated externally within the framework of the postwar 
multilateral institutions like the GATT/WTO. Regional cooperative processes like APEC 
later complemented that framework, encouraging unilateral reform across the region. 
Following the bursting of the asset bubble in the early 1990s and the onset of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, Japan turned from reliance on the multilateral system to policies based on 
preferential bilateralism in trade policy to secure its regional trading interests. Japan’s 
bilateral trade agreements have been largely ineffective in supporting the kind of deep-seated 
reform to regulatory institutions and competition policies needed to sustain long-term 
productivity growth. The evidence suggests that Japanese productivity has underperformed 
against its peers in the industrial world and Asia. Instead of using foreign economic policy as 
an instrument of domestic reform and productivity enhancement, Japan has used bilateral 
deals largely as political and strategic tools. Re-establishing a link between Japan’s domestic 
reform agenda and its economic diplomacy is important for structural reform and national 
economic success, as is a more sure-footed engagement with China. 
 
 
Postwar trade and industrial transformation  
The first four decades after the Second World War saw Japan effect a remarkable and 
successful trade and industrial transformation that allowed the economy not only to recover 
from the disastrous waste of war but also to catch up to the per capita income levels and 
living standards in the advanced industrial world. Postwar, the GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade)  later the WTO (World Trade Organization)  along with the global 
international institutions underpinning the Bretton Woods arrangements, put in place by the 
United States and its Allies, were critical to renewing confidence in global economic 
engagement.  
Japanese trade policy strategy over this forty-five year postwar period was directed at 
establishing access to global markets. Market access was a prerequisite to acquiring the low 
cost capital goods, technologies, industrial raw materials and international food supplies that 
could bring industrial success and prosperity to a population-dense, resource-deficient 
economy such as that of Japan. During the first twenty years, diplomatic energies were 
focused on extending the practice of the “most-favored-nation” (MFN) principle. This 
strategy offered Japan the promise of access to international markets and established Japan as 
a member of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) club 
and an Article IV member of the IMF (International Monetary Fund). While the lowering of 
barriers to imports came slower, through successive rounds of GATT negotiations and 
through bilateral pressures from the United States (with significant and generally accepted 
exclusions like agriculture), this was still a period of substantial progress in the liberalization 
of Japanese markets for tradable goods.1  
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There was also pushback against the liberalization in the trade regime  in the form of 
restrictions on trade negotiated bilaterally outside the system  that controlled the growth of 
trade in textiles, for example. The precursor of more general restrictions that came to govern 
trade in textiles was the US-Japan Cotton Textiles Agreement of 19622; these restrictions 
were not wound back until the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the 1980s. 
Yet, even at the height of Japan’s participation in multilateral liberalization, and despite 
formal adherence to the idea of all-round trade liberalization, strong currents of mercantilism 
remained in Japan’s practice of trade policy.3 The focus was on promotion of exports and 
opening export markets more than on the liberalization of import markets in sectors in which 
Japan had a strong comparative disadvantage. A corollary of this current of mercantilism was 
an undervalued currency, faster growth of exports than of imports, and the steady 
accumulation of trade balances and current account surpluses, although these surpluses were 
mainly the result of other causes of the growth of Japanese net savings.4  
 
Becoming a global player 
While Japan remained a relatively small economy and held a relatively small share in 
international trade, it could get away with mercantilist, asymmetrical trade liberalization. 
However, as the economy grew and Japan became a large economy (and less of a “price-
taker” in international markets) whose trade policy behavior was of greater and greater 
importance to other major trading economies, the pressure mounted on Japan to undertake 
broader trade liberalization.5 Reform of the international monetary system after 1971, 
growing flexibility in international exchange rates, and strong appreciation of the yen all put 
increasing pressure on the tradable goods sectors in the Japanese economy (excluding 
agriculture, which was insulated from international markets by quantitative barriers to trade) 
to maintain competitiveness through globalizing production. The 1980s saw a massive shift 
in Japanese production of labor-intensive activities offshore as the yen appreciated rapidly 
after the 1985 Plaza Accord, especially into Asia, driving a large growth of direct foreign 
investment and the expansion of international production networks.6 
Argument in outline 
The 1980s were the heyday of Japan’s economic success. The catch-up with the advanced 
industrial economies was achieved. The currency was appreciating rapidly, foreign 
investment in Asia and around the world was expanding and world economic leadership 
seemed within Japan’s grasp. The country was assuming an important role in fashioning a 
new economic order in Asia and the Pacific. But the 1990s saw all this come tumbling down 
with the bursting of the asset bubble and the financial system in crisis.  
This paper explores the international economic policy dimensions of Japan’s economic 
performance in the two decades that followed.  
We identify the three pillars of international policy strategy that underpinned Japan’s success 
in the 1980s: it was a period of reform, trade liberalization and large-scale investment by 
Japanese corporations abroad. It was also the era of the rise of the yen during a time of 
international monetary reform when Japan was at the forefront of economic diplomacy that 
provided new confidence in Asia Pacific economic cooperation. In the 1990s, but especially 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japan took a sharp turn away from commitment to the 
multilateral economic regime, of which it had been a significant beneficiary in the postwar 
period and an exemplar of its success, choosing a path of preferential bilateralism in trade 
policy to secure its regional trading interests. During the “lost decades,” Japan failed to 
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develop a coherent strategy for playing a significant role in the international monetary system 
and the limitations of foreign economic diplomacy over these years can be presumed to have 
affected economic performance more generally.  
 
Grand Asian trade and economic reform strategy 
Japan’s trade growth and industrial development, which sustained higher than average growth 
in Japanese manufacturing productivity and put a safety net under Japanese economic 
performance even through the lost decades, was facilitated by three major initiatives in 
international economic policy in the 1980s. The first was commitment to liberalization of the 
international capital account and allowing the yen to appreciate strongly. The second was 
early commitment to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and becoming a collective 
player in broadening the GATT agenda to embrace dismantling the restrictions that had 
constrained exports of labor-intensive commodities (importantly textiles and clothing) from 
emerging economies, mainly Japan’s neighbors in Asia. The third was a commitment to join 
with Australia in shaping the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process that 
entrenched open trade and investment regimes across the region,7 including ultimately in 
China. These commitments were the pillars of the foreign economic policy strategy that 
fostered remarkable Asian economic growth, collective commitment to economic reform and 
liberalization, and captured the gains from deeper integration in the East Asian and Pacific 
economies. 
Steady appreciation of the yen from the late 1970s onward, and the pressure of appreciation 
following the Plaza Accord in the 1980s, forced Japanese manufacturing offshore to maintain 
industrial competitiveness. The share of Japanese manufacturing output produced offshore 
has accelerated sharply over the subsequent quarter-century. Japanese corporations in the 
textiles and consumer electronics sector led the push into shifting the labor-intensive end of 
their activities abroad, first into Southeast Asia and later into China and elsewhere.8 Japanese 
direct foreign investment into Asia surged and Japanese production networks, once 
characterized by their impenetrability by foreign suppliers,9 led the way to the establishment 
of the complex, and open, supply chain networks that typify the high degree of trade and 
investment integration in the East Asian economy today.10 
 
Opening regional trade and investment 
This development would not have been possible without a commitment in most economies 
across the region to open trade and investment regimes. An initiative important to 
entrenching East Asian economic openness was Japan’s active role in helping to secure an 
emerging economy agenda in the Uruguay Round of GATT trade negotiations. Meanwhile, 
Malaysia and other Southeast Asian economies, as well as China, had established Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs), and they provided a platform for launching extensive offshore 
assembly production facilities, predominantly from Japan but also from other countries. The 
Uruguay Round saw the elaborate quantitative restrictions on the textiles and clothing trade 
gradually dismantled and agriculture brought into the negotiating agenda. Later, the 
Information Technology Agreement under the WTO reinforced the process of offshore 
manufacturing and assembly in electronics and electrical goods.11 
A complementary strategy involved Japan’s leadership with Australia in establishing the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the primary framework for regional 
economic cooperation. The move to set up APEC signaled a newly emerging economic and 
political order in East Asia and the Pacific in the late 1980s and Japan was a principal 
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player.12 The Asia Pacific region is characterized by massive economic and political 
transformations, whose scale and impact on the global economic system have centered 
dramatically on the growth of China in recent years. Japanese strategies toward regional 
cooperation needed to recognize that this process of transformation would continue, that it 
was positive, and that choking it off would damage prospects for regional prosperity and 
political and economic security. These consequences were not anticipated, at least by 
Japanese leaders, who did not foresee that China’s rise would eventually overshadow Japan’s 
Asian leadership ambitions. Indeed, very few forecast accurately what these developments 
would set in train, even if their broad shape was not much in doubt.13 
From the beginning, Asia’s integration into the regional and global economy and its approach 
to regional cooperation was organized around a strategy of inclusiveness, born of the interest 
in continuing economic, political and social change in East Asia. That interest is where the 
idea of open regionalism originated. It was important in this part of the world that regional 
cooperation be open in terms of the principles informing economic policy strategy, to realize 
the continuing inclusion of new players in the process and new opportunities for regional 
growth, trade and development. Through the 1990s China joined in this process and with 
successive unilateral trade liberalizations (especially those announced at the APEC Osaka 
Summit in 1995) as staging posts along the way eventually negotiated accession to the WTO 
in 2001. 
These three pillars of Japanese international economic strategy, laid down in the 1980s, have 
sustained the competitiveness of Japan’s core manufacturing sector over the past two to three 
decades. They are a significant factor behind Japanese manufacturing industry’s superior 
productivity performance14, and the baseline established to protect Japan against lower real 
income growth per head as the non-working population grew with a rapidly ageing Japanese 
population. Since the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, Japan has not given significant 
priority to APEC and it has launched a bilateral “free trade agreement” (FTA) strategy as the 
principal instrument of its foreign trade diplomacy. And yet, the three pillars remain in place 
and have had by far the most dominant impact on Japanese external commercial relations.  
By the end of the 1980s a model built on “export-oriented” growth was no longer sustainable. 
The combination of a strong yen after the Plaza Accord with an expansionary monetary 
policy fed a massive asset price bubble that eventually burst in 1991.15 Reliance on export-led 
recovery from the recession that followed was no longer a formula that worked. Japan’s 
integration into the global economy was of course still critical to maintaining productivity 
(and income) growth, as explained above. But the country was not able to rely on export 
demand as a major driver of the economy’s growth (although after China’s 2001 accession to 
the WTO, the spurt of Chinese demand provided a new fillip to Japan’s externally-driven 
growth). Unwinding the mess in which Japan’s leading financial institutions found 
themselves mired was a slow process.16 The political will to deal with the structural problems 
that Japan faced in both the financial sector and in the vastly over-invested real economy was 
grossly absent.  
 
Tactical retreat to bilateralism 
The trade policy response to Japan’s economic malaise of the 1990s, notably after the Asian 
financial crisis and failure to launch a new WTO round in 1997, was to retreat from the 
multilateral system and principles and ostensibly to seek revival of trade growth through 
embracing a strategy that put FTAs at the center. This aim was a significant shift in trade 
policy philosophy. Japan had stood out as a major trader that had eschewed discrimination in 
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its approach to trade negotiations and clung resolutely to the MFN trading principle up until 
the 1990s.  
Asian financial crisis and loss of faith in Washington 
Regional institution building until the Asian financial crisis was limited to APEC and had 
required the involvement of the US, as political estrangement between major East Asian 
countries made regional cooperation difficult. East Asian economic integration was market-
led, with APEC as the platform of cooperation and the concept of open regionalism allowing 
trade cooperation between East Asian neighbors without discriminating against those outside 
the region. This meant financial and monetary cooperation was at an embryonic stage when 
the Asian financial crisis hit, and arguably allowed the crisis to emerge in the way it did. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 was an important turning point for East Asia. As 
growth in East Asia hit a wall in 1997, with Japan in the midst of its banking crisis and 
already facing half a decade of slow growth, the region looked to Washington for help  help 
which never came. Consequently, confidence in US leadership and engagement in Asia was 
severely shaken. 
As the then-second largest economy in the world, Japan played an important role in the 
process of putting together the rescue packages for the East Asian economies and was in fact 
their main donor under the 1999 aid initiative known as the Miyazawa Plan. But Japan was 
less successful in influencing the substance of the rescue packages or defining strategies  
such as through the proposed creation of an Asian Monetary Fund  for dealing with future 
crises due to a lack of capacity to provide overall leadership due to its own financial and 
economic problems.17  
The Asian financial crisis was the proximate cause of the collapse of the status quo that 
triggered the emergence of the new regionalism in East Asia. A more exclusively East Asian 
regionalism and preferential trading initiatives gained sway: this was partly driven by the 
complex political response to Washington’s weak role in dealing with the 1997 financial 
crisis, the inability of Japan to lead the region because of its own economic problems, and 
partly due to a loss of faith in APEC’s ability to resolve contemporary financial problems. 
Those forces were both economic and political and they drove the marked shift in thinking 
about regional cooperation in East Asia and the Pacific.18 
Ambitions for an East Asian community 
Previously, former Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia had proposed but failed to form an 
East Asian Economic Caucus. However, the circumstances in the late 1990s were quite 
different. The mismanagement of the crisis coupled with the failure to launch a new WTO 
round of trade negotiations in Seattle, which had been so central to APEC’s trade 
liberalization agenda,19 came to justify heading in a new direction through the ASEAN+3 
enterprise, and the negotiation of bilateral preferential trade arrangements in East Asia.20 
ASEAN+3 is now at the core of East Asian arrangements, including the East Asian Summit. 
The East Asian financial crisis provided an imperative for deeper financial and trade 
cooperation within East Asia. However, Japan’s own domestic financial market was hit hard 
by the crisis, and its call for an “Asian Monetary Fund” met with little support, even within 
the East Asian region. Japan had little willpower or capacity to avert the US retreat from a 
new WTO round in Seattle in 1998 and impetus on the issue of trade liberalization within the 
APEC framework waned. It was against this backdrop that the emergence of ASEAN+3 
reflected the regional interest in re-grouping, constructing a framework for institutionalizing 
economic cooperation within the East Asian region.21 
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To the East Asian governments, ASEAN+3 was a convenient insurance policy for East Asian 
dealings with Washington and an expression of regional solidarity through socio-economic 
cooperation and interdependence. This concept of an emerging East Asian Community 
gathered momentum in the coming years, although the leadership contest between Japan and 
China gnawed at its core. Finally, by January 2002 in Singapore, Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro proposed extending the East Asian community to include cooperation beyond trade 
and financial issues to promote regional integration, with Australia and New Zealand among 
its members. In 2005, when the first East Asian Summit was convened, Australia, New 
Zealand and India were invited to participate in union with the ASEAN+3. 
Neither the ASEAN+3 group nor the ASEAN+6 group was able to formalize into trade 
arrangements measures that were being advocated by some who wanted more binding 
cooperation. The real value gained from the East Asian arrangements was the 
institutionalized cooperation and resulting institution-building done on East Asian terms. 
ASEAN+3 in particular provided a framework for demonstrating East Asian leadership and 
influence on regional and international affairs. The focus in ASEAN+3 was very much on 
financial cooperation. China came to this arrangement, embracing Japan, with unexpected 
enthusiasm. This was a deeply political decision, much more than an economic policy 
strategy. China’s interest in ASEAN+3, encouraged by political events, like the bombing of 
its embassy in Belgrade and the Cox Report in the United States, also acted as an insurance 
against continuing problems in the US-China relationship.  
Alongside the development of regionalism under the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 framework, 
many countries in the region looked to strengthen ties and bilateral deals offered a relatively 
easy way forward.  
Bilateral preferentialism 
Japan’s advocacy and the priority it attached to the multilateral trading system began to end 
in favor of preferential trade agreements in 1998.22 This occurred not because of any 
purposeful decision that had been debated in Japanese policy making circles or because of a 
strategic leadership decision but in the lead-up to South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s 
visit to Japan. The context was the Asian financial crisis, Japan and East Asia’s quest for 
stronger institutional ties, the desire for stronger political ties within Asia, and a search for 
Korea-Japan rapprochement.  
The White Paper on International Trade that MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry) issued in 1998 still espoused the supremacy of the multilateral system for Japanese 
trade, and the only mention that FTAs received in it was negative. 23 Yet, by late 1998 Japan 
and Korea were embarking on plans for an FTA, culminating in the launch of a joint study of 
a Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement by December that year with ministerial support. That 
agreement has yet to be negotiated as political differences among the parties and an inability 
to liberalize have stymied the process. 
Japan’s first foray into negotiating FTAs was with Singapore in 2002. A Japan-Singapore 
agreement was proposed in December 1999 and a joint study launched in 2000, half way 
through the “lost decades”. This was not only Japan’s first bilateral trade agreement but, 
significantly, the first bilateral FTA between two Asian countries. The agreement was termed 
an economic partnership agreement (EPA) and was relatively easy to promote given that 
Singapore had virtually no tariffs and that agriculture could be excluded because Singapore 
did not have an agricultural sector.24 The 1999 White Paper on International Trade from 
MITI revealed a shift in philosophy towards FTAs while still noting their dangers for the 
multilateral system.25 The argument in favor of FTAs was that they could “provide models of 
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rule-making for multilateral fora including the WTO” and were “able to advance multilateral 
negotiations stuck in deadlock.”26 Unfortunately, subsequent White Papers from METI (the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) have not explicitly nor actively directed FTAs 
towards strengthening the multilateral system.27 Given the lack of liberalization that the 
Japan-Singapore EPA brought with it, its significance was mostly symbolic in the message it 
sent to the rest of the region. The Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement signaled a retreat 
from Japan’s strong support for the multilateral system and the MFN principle. It also 
encouraged China to quickly negotiate an FTA with ASEAN, and FTAs have since 
proliferated among Japan’s neighbors and trading partners.  
Apart from Singapore (which, as stated above, has no agricultural sector), Switzerland (not a 
major trading partner of Japan) and recently Australia, Japan’s FTAs to date have all been 
with developing countries. Japan took measures to offer investment and economic 
cooperation to these countries while keeping its own agricultural sector largely protected.28 
The same strategy allowed Japanese service industries to be excluded from its trade 
agreements. Japan’s negotiations with developed countries which are also major agricultural 
exporters stalled because of these tactics. The Australian agreement had been stalled over 
agriculture until a political deal was reached with the resulting preferential agricultural 
liberalization limited.  
Yet, the trade and investment diverted away from non-FTA members have not been as 
damaging to economic relations, and therefore have not significantly undermined political 
relations in Asia as much as many studies had predicted.29 The reason is not because FTAs 
took into account the interests of third parties and the multilateral system, but rather because 
they were not comprehensive enough and had no real economic bite.30  
Divorce of trade policy from national reform objectives  
Japan has EPAs under negotiation with South Korea, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Canada, 
Mongolia, Colombia and the European Union. While the rhetoric might suggest otherwise, 
the impact of the agreements thus far has been limited and piecemeal  protecting against, 
rather than promoting, needed reforms in agriculture and services, advancing particular, 
limited interests in partner economies (such as investor protection and aid procurement)  
and not directed towards any strategic national reform and growth goal. Japan’s early FTAs 
were not entered into after careful deliberation of their economic costs and benefits but were 
politically, diplomatically and strategically oriented.31  
Major reforms of regulatory institutions and competition policies that would lift Japanese 
productivity in services (effectively the non-tradable sector) cannot be delivered through 
negotiating trade agreements, even with advanced economies such as the United States.32 
These reforms have been entirely absent in the negotiating agendas of the Japanese bilateral 
FTAs put in place with a range of developing country partners. The pattern of Japanese 
international trade diplomacy over these years aimed to avoid negotiation of sensitive, 
reform-embracing issues with advanced country partners such as Australia or the US. The 
FTAs that describe Japan’s international trade and economic policy strategy over the past two 
decades have specifically avoided the difficult reforms. Indeed, avoiding the challenge of 
agricultural trade liberalization has been a critical factor in determining the priority in FTA 
negotiations. Extant agreements have been called EPA arrangements and aimed at securing 
treatment of Japanese investment abroad and access in partners who have little leverage in 
opening Japanese markets. There is hope among Japanese advocates for delivering a broad 
economic reform agenda through the Japan-EU FTA and through the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) negotiations. However, that may be misplaced, too, unless those 
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negotiations are taken as a symbol of commitment to much broader reform beyond what 
would actually be included in the negotiations themselves.  
Bilateral and preferential trade agreements could have been directed at making progress on 
some priority areas of reform and liberalization in Japan. A heavily protected and subsidized 
agricultural sector, although a relatively small part of the economy and shrinking over these 
decades to only 1.5 percent of GDP (in 2005),33 is a drag on Japanese government revenues 
and has hamstrung Japanese economic diplomacy. To put it succinctly, Japan chose to 
negotiate only with partners with whom the agriculture issue could be avoided. Liberalization 
of this sensitive sector was minimized because of the agricultural lobby’s stranglehold on 
Japanese lawmakers.34 Trade agreements could have been used to break the deadlock in some 
of Japan’s most protected sectors, before opening up to the rest of the world. This strategic 
intent was absent from Japanese negotiating strategy; FTAs were acquired more as 
diplomatic trophies than pursued as elements in a serious economic reform strategy. The 
contrast between Korea’s and Japan’s approaches to FTAs could not be more stark. 
Contrasting Japanese and Korean strategies 
Japan’s trade policy strategy contrasts sharply with that of its neighbor Korea, which 
negotiated major bilateral agreements with the US and Europe and used them to effect 
significant domestic reforms in services and agriculture. Korea was strategic in its trade 
policy approach, using FTAs to open up a wide range of industries  such as financial, 
insurance, and other service sectors as well as agriculture, automobile and other industries  
to more international competition. While liberalization through FTAs has its drawbacks, 
given the preferential and limited nature of liberalization (and Korean FTAs were no 
exception in their discrimination against other partners such as Australia), Korea used this 
policy tool for broad economic reform, not merely diplomatic purposes.  
Korea’s FTAs have been the most comprehensive in Asia. Nowhere else in Asia has an FTA 
strategy been so successful in liberalizing protected sectors and so closely connected to 
furthering domestic reforms. The challenge now for Korea is to remove the distortions that 
FTAs have introduced into its trading structure by opening up to the rest of the world, 
including Japan and China, so that it can increase competition and contestability in its market 
through extending access to lower cost and more efficient suppliers of goods and services.35  
The most significant example in the region of how to connect domestic reform priorities to 
external trade policy is that of China through its progress via accession to the WTO in 2001. 
China used the run-up to WTO accession to liberalize and to open up unilaterally on an 
unprecedented scale, while also using platforms like APEC to deliver on its reform agenda. 
Signing up to the WTO entrenched and extended the domestic economic and institutional 
reforms that were required across the country. While the circumstances of China’s accession 
to the WTO were completely different from the challenges that Japan faced over the past two 
decades, the lesson is one of how leadership in one case did, and in the other case did not, 
mobilize external arrangements to promote critical domestic reforms. 
It is perhaps ironic that Japan’s initial shift in policy toward FTAs came with the exploration 
of an FTA with Korea  only to be put on hold because it could not manage political 
cleavages, or embrace the difficulty of negotiating a comprehensive trading agreement with 
its important neighbor, while Korea went on to sign meaningful agreements with its major 





Failure to internationalize the yen 
The economic rise of Japan made it the second largest economy in the world  on a trajectory 
at one stage that seemed poised to overtake the United States as the largest. As Japan’s 
weight in global transactions increased, the prospect that the yen might become a significant 
international reserve currency appeared real. The yen had the potential to be widely used for 
invoicing international trade and to be held in reserves for exchange management and as 
insurance against financial and economic shocks. The potential of the Japanese yen as an 
international currency gained attention in the mid-1980s, and again after the Asian financial 
crisis at the end of the 1990s. In the earlier period this was encouraged by the rise of the 
Japanese economy and later an anxiety about over-reliance of the East Asian region on the 
dollar. The yen satisfied some of the prerequisites for development as an international 
currency, with Japan’s political stability and large economy; but what was absent were deep, 
broad and efficient financial markets, and the liberalization of the capital account was 
incomplete.  
 
In the 1980s domestic political ambivalence over currency strategies prevented decisive steps 
necessary to internationalize the yen. In part this was due to the long dependence on the 
dollar.36 The Bank of Japan was reluctant to lose its macroeconomic policy autonomy by 
relaxing capital controls and there was a split within the Ministry of Finance over whether to 
proceed.37 Domestic opposition to financial liberalization resulted in underdevelopment of 
short-term financial markets, making it less attractive for non-residents to hold yen. The 
forces opposing the internationalization of the yen feared that less control over the yen, if it 
became a reserve currency, would mean Japan would likely have to run a current account 
deficit. Holdings of yen reserves by Asian countries grew from 15 percent of their total 
holdings in 1983 to 30 percent in 1987, mostly due to the appreciation of the yen after the 
Plaza Accord, but they fell to 17 percent by 1990.38  
 
In the late 1990s there was a second wave of interest in the internationalization of the yen 
with the prospect of the emergence of the Euro currency zone in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis. The crisis provided strong incentive in Japan to promote the use of the yen in 
East Asia. Dependence on the dollar, including pegging regional exchange rates to it, was 
seen as one of the causes of the crisis. But by then Japan was in the middle of the first decade 
of economic stagnation, and promoting the international use of the yen was even less likely 
than it had been in the 1980s. The yen's role as a vehicle currency for trade between third 
countries had also been negligible. Much of Japan’s large volume of trade with its East Asian 
neighbors was invoiced in dollars because many of these countries pegged their exchange 
rates to the dollar and the final destination for goods resulting from the Asian production 
networks was the United States. All of its resource trade was transacted in dollars. But it was 
the lack of financial market development that fundamentally hampered the use of yen-
invoiced trade.  
 
Japanese financial and capital markets were never fully deregulated in the 1980s  and in the 
late 1990s, when policy makers revisited the internationalization of the yen, this situation 
continued. Even as late as 1998 there were major constraints on yen transactions in domestic 
capital markets, especially in short-term capital markets, which stymied the use of the yen 
internationally.39 There was a need for risk-free assets and highly liquid financial products, 
which are important as a benchmarking tool in developing financial products and also for 
deepening the financial and credit markets. The lack of liquidity and financial market 
development meant that the Japanese market did not establish a yield curve; and that 
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restricted access to risk-hedging measures. Japanese yen balances and assets held by non-
residents was, and is, low. 
 
Some in Japan argue that language difference is a significant reason for why the yen did not 
internationalize. But this barrier would seem to have been insignificant compared to the 
failure to commit to developing liberalized, deep, broad and efficient financial markets. 
Rather, policy indecision and the failure to undertake the financial market reforms that are 
necessary for currency internationalization were the major reasons why Japan missed the 
opportunity to become a significant player in the international financial system. How did 
these weaknesses in foreign economic policy strategies affect Japan’s economic 
performance? This is the core question in this paper. In order to answer it, first we need to 
define the benchmarks whereby Japan’s economic performance might be judged objectively. 
This can be done by measuring Japan’s economic potential and assessing how fully it was 
realized. 
 
Japan’s economic potential  
We can start by asking how Japan’s economic performance compared with similar economies 
over the years of the lost decades. This question is critical to a careful assessment of whether 
Japan’s economic performance was an inescapable consequence of its economic and 
demographic destiny, or whether the policy choices that were made over these years led to 
under-achievement and a failure to realize the country’s true potential. If the economic 
indicators for other economies  in similar circumstances, beset by similar problems  reveal 
a better performance than that of Japan, the sobriquet “lost decades” is apposite. These 
comparisons provide a metric by which Japan’s performance can be judged objectively and 
some scientific precision brought to bear on the question. 
At the core of Japan’s economic bind is the management of the dramatic impact of its 
shrinking population. While this demographic transformation is of a kind that is now more 
common among mature industrial economies, nowhere else is it quite as intense it seems as in 
Japan. With a shrinking workforce having a strongly negative effect on output per head of 
population, the only way to lift economic growth is to lift productivity substantially. Japan 
can only get more output from its shrinking population by encouraging or requiring that a 
larger proportion of the population actively engage in work or by lifting the average product 
of labor employed. There are also, of course, the options of lifting the population base over 
time through immigration or pro-natal policies. 
Table 1 sets out data that shows how Japan’s performance measures up objectively in 
comparison with other economies that have characteristics that, in one dimension or another, 
match those of Japan. As Column 1 in the table demonstrates, Japan’s overall growth in real 
income per head of population has been below average OECD growth rates for most of the 
period after 1990 as well as all individual OECD economies selected here except for France 
for the five years from 1990 to 1995 and Italy and the United Kingdom (which it matched) 
for the five years from 2005 to 2011. But, after adjusting for the shrinkage in the workforce 
and the ageing of the population, Japan’s GDP growth rate per working-age population is 
highest among industrialized countries over the 2000 to 2010 period.40 Japanese overall 
performance by this measure, it is argued, is not as bad as it looks from the measure of output 
per head; and there were periods, for example during the Koizumi years, when Japan actually 
did relatively well. Yet, as shown in Column 6, which sets out comparative labor productivity 
performance after 1990, only in the period 2000 to 2005 was Japan’s annual rate of 
productivity growth unambiguously better than those of the OECD economies selected for 
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comparison. For most of these years, productivity growth was not especially high. It certainly 
was not able to significantly overwhelm the effects of the shrinking workforce on overall 
growth, as reflected in Column 5. 
An analysis of the contribution of labor, capital and total factor productivity (a measure of the 
impact of increased efficiency and improved technology in lifting output per unit of factor 
input) to GDP growth in Japan and the selected OECD economies is more telling. Except for 
the years 2000 to 2005, total factor productivity growth in Japan was lower than that of major 
comparable OECD economies and, even in that period 2000 to 2005, the United Kingdom 
and the United States both had higher total factor productivity growth than that of Japan. In 
short, while Japan’s total factor productivity has grown moderately well, it has not grown as 
rapidly as that of the best performing comparable economies.41 It should be added that 
Japan’s performance on all these measures over the entire period has fallen well short of that 
of Korea, although it might be argued that Korea, with a lower per capita income, still had 
some catch-up potential that it could take advantage of at that time. While productivity in 
Japanese firms remains higher than in Korean firms, there is much evidence that Korean 
firms caught up very rapidly over these years.42 
 
Japan’s international performance 
How does Japan’s mediocre, or at best average, economic performance relate to its external 
economic strategies? 
One way of assessing the efficiency and contestability of national markets is to compare how 
Japan’s actual trade flows and investment flows compare with potential flows and how much 
of potential trade and investment was captured relative to comparable economies. The data in 
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 1 provide an idea of the extent to which these OECD economies 
have realized their trade potential on this measure (see Appendix for a full explanation of 
how these indexes are calculated). The ratios of actual trade flows (exports and imports) to 
potential trade flows (estimated from the frontier of best performance derived from the 
analysis of trade flows and economies’ location, endowments and size) provide an 
econometric measure of the openness and efficiency of each economy’s integration into 
international trade. These ratios are reported in Columns 8 and 9 of the table for the last two 
periods in the sample. Similarly, the ratios of actual inward investment flows to potential 
inward investment flows (derived from a frontier of best investment performance in a way 
analogous to that for the trade frontier) are seen in Column 7. 
Trade integration has become deeper and the realization of both export and import potential 
has risen somewhat for most countries over the two periods for which these data are 
available. But Japan’s trade performance  the ratio of its actual trade flows to potential trade 
 was extremely low over both periods when compared with similar economies in Asia and 
in the industrial world. Japan realized only 36 percent of its export potential and 33 of its 
import potential in the period from 2000 to 2005; and 39 percent of its export potential and 
34 percent of its import potential in the period from 2005 to 2011. In both periods for which 
these calculations are made, Japan achieved less of its export and import potential than any of 
these OECD economies. This gap implies that Japanese trade policies and institutions were 
significantly less open than those of comparable economies. The contrast with Korea’s 
performance is marked. Korea had significantly higher and rising export and import 
performance over these years, with exports at 52 percent and imports at 40 percent of 
potential in the last period, significantly closer to its trade frontier than Japan.  
12	
 
Investment flows are another important channel allowing us to see the benefits of integration 
into the international economy. Foreign direct investment outflows reflect the capacity of a 
country’s businesses to reap the rewards of the capital, know-how, and technological and 
marketing assets it has accumulated through investment abroad. More importantly, inward 
investment flows reflect the contribution through investment that foreign firms bring to a 
country’s economy through their capital, know-how, and technology. High levels of 
engagement in foreign investment are critical to the ability of mature economies to stay close 
to the global technology frontier and to maintain access to the latest management and 
technological capabilities.  
Japan’s inward investment performance, at 18 percent of potential in 2000-2005 and 22 
percent in 2005-2011 is markedly worse than all these OECD economies, except for Korea. 
In respect of openness to foreign investment, Korea’s performance was similar to that of 
Japan. Most other OECD countries were almost twice as open as Japan to foreign investors in 
both periods. The Japanese foreign investment policy regime and related institutions and 
policy settings limit flows of foreign investment into Japan and stymie productivity, 
innovation, and growth. Although Japan’s outward foreign investment is extensive, especially 
in production networks around Asia, similar analysis also reveals that Japan’s performance 
on this front is also well below potential, at 30 percent in both periods compared with close to 




Table 1: Comparative Measures of Japan' s Potential and Actual Economic Performance During the Lost Decades 
           
Period Country GDP Growth 















Labor TFP  (Inward Stock) Export Import 
1985-
1990 
Canada 2.8 2 -0.6 2.6 2.6 0.3    
France 3.2 0.8 1.6 1.0 1.0 2.2    
Germany Na Na Na 1.9 0.8 1.4    
Italy 3.1 0.7 1.4 0.9 0.9 2.3    
Japan 4.9 0.3 3.2 1.0 0.4 3.9    
Korea 9.9 1.9 6 3.9 2.3 6.3    
Netherlands 3.3 1.3 1.1 2.4 1.7 0.9    
United Kingdom 3.3 1.5 0.4 1.8 1.8 1.5    
United States 3.2 1.5 0.8 2.0 2.0 1.2    
1990-
1995 
Canada 1.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 -0.1 1.6    
France 1.2 -0.6 1.1 -0.1 -0.7 1.3    
Germany na Na na -0.1 -0.5 2.1    
Italy 1.3 -0.6 1.2 -0.7 -0.8 2.0    
Japan 1.4 -0.5 0.6 0.8 -0.7 0.6    
Korea 7.6 1.8 3.8 2.4 2.2 5.3    
Netherlands 2.3 1 0.5 1.3 1.4 0.9    
United Kingdom 1.6 -0.9 1.3 -0.8 -1.2 2.8    
United States 2.5 1 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.3    
1995-
2000 
Canada 4 1.6 1.2 2.1 2.1 2.0    
France 2.7 0.5 1.3 1.6 0.7 1.1    
Germany 1.8 0 1.1 0.8 0.0 1.0    
Italy 1.9 0.7 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.9    
Japan 0.8 -0.9 0.7 -0.5 -1.2 1.3    
Korea 5.1 -0.3 3.6 0.7 -0.4 4.4    
Netherlands 4 1.7 1.2 2.6 2.3 1.5    
United Kingdom 3.4 0.7 1.3 1.3 0.9 2.3    
United States 4.3 1.6 1.5 2.0 1.9 2.3     
2000-
2005 
Canada 2.5 1 0.5 2.0 1.7 0.5 0.31 0.39 0.37 
France 1.6 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.34 0.43 0.38 
Germany 0.6 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 -0.8 0.8 0.30 0.43 0.38 
Italy 1 0.6 -0.4 1.2 0.8 -0.3 0.22 0.40 0.36 
Japan 1.2 -0.5 1.1 -0.1 -0.6 1.3 0.18 0.36 0.33 
Korea 4.4 0.2 2.8 1.6 0.3 2.9 0.18 0.49 0.36 
Netherlands 1.3 -0.2 0.9 0.3 -0.3 1.0 0.29 0.48 0.38 
United Kingdom 2.9 0.5 1.3 0.9 0.6 2.0 0.37 0.41 0.37 
United States 2.4 -0.1 1.8 0.3 -0.1 2.1 0.35 0.38 0.43 
2005-
2011 
Canada 1.4 0.7 -0.1 1.3 0.9 0.1 0.40 0.41 0.37 
France 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.43 0.42 0.38 
Germany 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.37 0.44 0.39 
Italy -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 0.25 0.41 0.37 
Japan 0.3 -0.5 0.6 -0.3 -0.7 0.5 0.22 0.39 0.34 
Korea 3.7 -0.7 3.3 1.0 -1.0 2.8 0.21 0.52 0.40 
Netherlands na Na na 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.38 0.50 0.42 
United Kingdom 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.4 0.42 0.41 0.38 
United States 0.9 -0.4 0.8 -0.3 -0.4 1.2 0.38 0.41 0.42 
 
In Columns 1 to 6 annual growth rates here are calculated as annual compound growth rates. In Columns 7 to 9, the numbers are ratios or convert to percentages. 
 




The story of Japan’s poor foreign investment performance is related to a number of 
institutional impediments beyond controls of investment at the border. For one thing, the 
difficulty for foreign investors to acquire established firms through mergers or acquisitions 
relates to still-entrenched Japanese capital market institutions that cosset local firms. 
Additionally, Japan’s major cities fail to provide international business environments on a par 
with London, New York and Shanghai. Regulations on floor-area ratios, for example, limit 
accessible high-rise residential buildings in metropolitan Japan. Obstacles to setting up 
international schools and to allowing foreign doctors to practice, which are important 
amenities for attracting foreign firms and personnel to Japan, discourage the sojourn of 
professional and management personnel in Japan.43 Poor foreign investment performance is 
closely related to remarkably low rates of migration and movement of skilled and 
professional people into and out of the country on demography. Japan has the lowest net 
migration rate (0.2 per 1,000 people for 2005-2010) among the G7 countries and is the only 
OECD country that does not have a policy for integration of non-citizens. In a disturbing 
trend, the number of Japanese students enrolled at American universities has also dropped 38 
percent over the past decade. All these factors suggest that Japan has failed to translate gains 
from trade, foreign investment, international know-how and skills into economic growth. 
Figure 1 compares the ratio of inward stock of investment to GDP in a number of countries in 
Asia and the Pacific, including Japan. The extremely low ratio for Japan confirms its 
impenetrability to foreign investment compared with countries as diverse as the United 
States, China, and India. Figure 2 provides an OECD index of foreign investment 
restrictiveness across another diverse range of economies that reveals Japan the third most 
restrictive investment regime among the group, topped only by Indonesia and China. As 
Figure 3 shows, Japan also lagged behind the world in the dynamic area of services trade 
growth, with a growth rate around 62 percent that of the global average rate of growth and 



























While average product growth per person in the workforce was respectable in the decade 
after the year 2000, there was great variation across sectors of the economy, with poor 
performance in services and in other sectors insulated from international competition. Studies 
of cross-sectoral productivity performance suggest that the best performers were 
manufacturing sectors that liberalized, or service sectors that were subject to privatization or 
deregulation.45 A number of features distinguish the poor performing sectors in the Japanese 
economy. The first and most important is that it remains relatively closed. A second and 
related feature is the extent to which these sectors are burdened by government regulations 
and restrictions. Last, the extent to which those sectors of the economy have been burdened 

























If productivity performance had been uniformly high across sectors, Japan’s growth would 
have been considerably higher over these decades. It appears that the international 
contestability of markets (obviously in some commodities like agricultural goods but more 
importantly in services and capital markets) was an important factor that impeded Japanese 
growth over these years. 
Governments, through the past two decades, have not articulated a comprehensive strategy 
for reform and have been more focused on particular symptoms of the problem than its 
fundamental causes. A failure to reform labor market institutions to allow more flexibility in 
the re-allocation of labor and the increased participation of women when the supply is 
shrinking are both cases in point.47 An inability to break the deadlock on agricultural reform 
is another fundamental issue.48 The Japanese government continues to work in silos when the 
interdependence of policymaking is paramount to progress. This inability means that Japan 
does not articulate an international economic strategy that has comprehensive domestic 
structural reform as its centerpiece. 
And yet, of the burdens that, among other things, condemned Japan to two decades of 
stagnant growth, the manufacturing sector (unlike services and agriculture), continually 
exposed to intense international competition, has achieved a strong turnaround.49 While 
manufacturing firms cannot change the institutions that impede adjustment, for example in 
the labor market, they have maneuver around them. Such actions help explain why a third of 
the Japanese workforce is now employed as non-regular workers (non-lifetime employed).50  
Manufacturing corporations have raised competiveness by taking production of low-valued 
activities offshore into Asia and China on a large scale. Japanese firms that compete 
internationally have, on average, higher labor productivity. Those firms that export or are 
engaged in FDI are more productive than purely domestic firms.51 Over a third of the output 
of Japanese manufacturers is now produced abroad, significantly in Asia.52 Globalization of 
production and off-shoring has not produced the same strains at home that are evident in 
North America, among other reasons because the labor force is shrinking. The drift in 
international economic policy strategy has produced an economy that has an incredibly 
efficient manufacturing sector but is burdened by inefficiencies and low productivity growth 
in services and agriculture. In manufacturing, decades of trade liberalization and a measure of 
capital penetration have delivered internationally contestable markets that have maintained 
the pressure for productivity improvement and change. There is a strong correlation between 
openness to international competition and contestability and cross-sectoral productivity 
performance in the Japanese economy.53 
 
Foreign economic policy as an instrument of national reform  
What is clear is that over the past two decades Japanese governments have not enunciated a 
comprehensive strategy for reform. Japan’s economic performance has suffered. High 
impediments to achieving trade and investment potential, relative to comparable economies, 
are one important part of the problem. Many of the reforms that would deliver higher 
economic growth in Japan are largely domestic: they have to do with fixing the public and 
service sectors that relate to managing an ageing society through social benefits, the health 
sector, the pension system, taxation, and migration policy. But there is also an important 
international dimension to the structural reforms that Japan needs, related to how Japanese 
firms, especially those in the service sector, are to become more integrated into the global 
economy. Currently, the ratio of Japan’s trade (exports plus imports) to GDP is only one third 
of Germany’s54, and services trade as a proportion of GDP is low, with slow growth (Figure 
17 
 
3). With very little proactive policy change from Japan toward China during the period 1990-
2010, China went from accounting for 3.5 percent of Japan’s total merchandise trade to being 
by far the largest trading partner at 20.7 percent (Table 2). That remarkable shift in Japan’s 
trade relations occurred despite Japan’s political tensions with China. The bilateral trading 
relationship is now the third largest in the world and continuing to grow.  
 
Table 2: Japan’s top 10 trading partners (percent share and US$ mil) 
  1990   1995   2000  2005   2010 
    
China 3.5  7.4  10.0  17.0  20.7 
United States 27.6  25.4  25.0  18.1  13.0 
South Korea 5.6  6.2  6.0  6.4  6.2 
EU 4.6  5.6  6.3  5.5  5.2 
Australia 3.7  2.9  2.7  3.3  4.1 
Thailand 2.5  3.8  2.8  3.4  3.8 
Indonesia 3.4  3.1  2.8  2.7  3.0 
Hong Kong 2.9  3.9  3.4  3.4  3.0 
Saudi Arabia 2.6  1.6  2.0  3.0  2.9 
Malaysia 2.1  3.5  3.3  2.4  2.8 
Rest of world 41.5  36.5  35.8  34.7  35.4 
         
Total 521,746   779,032 858,984 1,110,807 1,462,460 
Source: UN Comtrade; authors’ calculations 
 
Japan’s domestic circumstances also infect the psychology of economic diplomacy and 
foreign policy. The strategic inconsistencies in the politics and economics of relations with 
China are little remarked upon, if indeed they are understood and accepted. There seems to be 
more and more acceptance of Japan’s middle power and dependent status internationally. 
This change is not necessarily bad or unrealistic but it appears as a consequence of drift rather 
than the product of deliberate national strategic choice. Foreign and security policy have not 
adapted to these circumstances. Whether this will be sustainable in the long term given 
Japan’s deeper and deeper economic interdependence with China’s growth remains a critical 
question. 
Regulatory barriers and protected markets 
As shown in the above analysis, Japan has maintained low degrees of openness to foreign 
investment and talent and international linkages compared to other industrial economies. The 
share of foreign investor participation in the Japanese economy is very low compared with 
that in other industrial countries. Attracting FDI and foreign talent requires structural reform 
that makes doing business in Japan easier, and it also means addressing the immigration 
issue. Indicators from 2010 show just how badly Japan has performed relative to the rest of 
the world in its business environment for foreign firms and foreign workers. The World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitive Index (GCI) ranks Japan at eighth overall in 2010, up 
from 13th in 2008 for the competitiveness of its economy.55
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But the rankings of Japan’s external economic engagement in the GCI’s Enabling Trade 
Index paint a different picture. Japan is ranked 25th overall internationally (of 125 countries) 
with the indicator for market access ranked 121  close to worst in the world. When market 
access is divided into its domestic and foreign components, it shows not only how protected 
Japan is from foreign entrants in the market  ranked 124, or second to last globally  but 
also how poorly it is ranked with respect to market access for new domestic entrants  at 98th 
globally. There are also issues in Japan’s regulatory environment according to the Enabling 
Trade Index, with Japan ranked 77th in openness to foreign participation due to the 
difficulties in hiring foreign labor (111th globally), prevalence of foreign ownership (89th), 
and the business impact of rules on FDI (92nd).56  
The World Bank’s Doing Business index ranks Japan 15th overall in ease of doing business, 
but looking at the components that comprise that overall score exposes similar problems to 
those identified in the GCI index. Japan ranks 90th in the ease in starting a business, 40th in 
employing workers, and 123rd in paying taxes.57 The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of 
the World index for 2010 paints a similar story, with Japan ranked 60th globally in freedom 
to trade internationally. Other aspects of Japan’s economic environment rank relatively 
highly in the less aggregated categories of the GCI’s Enabling Trade Index, with border 
administration ranked 16th, transport and communications infrastructure ranked 14th, and the 
business environment ranked 34th. Yet Japan, by these rankings, still does not score well for 
an advanced economy that is the world’s third largest economy. 
These rankings confirm what underlies the low performance as an FDI recipient (Table 1). 
For Japan to have open, efficient and contestable domestic markets it needs more open 
market access to both foreign and domestic firms. This cannot be done without significant 
regulatory reform, which is crucial to attracting more foreign investment and skilled foreign 
labor. The lack of deregulation of the non-manufacturing sector in the past two decades (and 
earlier) has led to productivity in those sectors (construction, retail and wholesale trade, real 
estate, agriculture, finance & insurance, and hotels & restaurants) to fall steadily behind the 
productivity of the manufacturing sector, which has been trade-exposed.58 
A paradigm shift in international economic policy thinking 
Unless foreign economic policy strategy is conceived of as an instrument of structural reform, 
there is little chance that it will contribute to the alleviation of Japan’s economic malaise. 
There is scant evidence that the conception or the delivery of foreign economic policy was so 
directed over the past decades. This change will require a paradigm shift in trade and 
international economic policy thinking. One problem may have been that the locus of trade 
policy development, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and, to a lesser extent, 
METI, was locked into a negotiating mentality not effectively informed by, or connected to, a 
well-outlined national reform agenda. Trade and economic diplomacy should be thought of as 
instruments for structural reform, not as the end goals in themselves with the objective of 
merely signing more international agreements. 
The position of Japan in the geo-political and economic world has changed significantly since 
the 1980s. It is not clear that either policy-making or thinking has come to terms with Japan’s 
new circumstances. Japan already sees Korea as a major competitor and threat to many of its 
prized and symbolic brands globally. Korea also challenges Japan’s former position in Asia 
as a dynamic force in regional and global leadership. Korea has hosted a number of regional 
and global summits such as the G20 Summit in 2010. The economic ascendancy of China, 
and the emergence of India, both mean that Japan’s position in the region is very different 
from what it was at the end of the 1980s. Japan’s new geo-political and economic 
circumstances after the beginning of the 1990s required a fundamental re-conception of how 
19 
 
it might successfully manage its foreign economic and national policy agenda. Failure to 
accept and to integrate these circumstances into the framing of policy and to set national 
priorities accordingly was bound to leave the country on the back foot in realizing its 
economic and political potential in this new international environment. Though the shift to 
dealing with China in the framework of the new ASEAN-based East Asian arrangements is 
evidence of appreciation of the need to grapple with these changes and establish new 
modalities for doing so, the mindset change necessary to capture Japan’s new moment in 
history was largely absent. Many clung to atavistic thinking about Japan retaining a role in 
Asia as first among equals, and claimed the status of first among equals without doing much 
about the need to earn it. Nowhere else is this thinking more palpable than in Japan’s 
reception of the elevation of the G20 meetings to global summit level after the global 
financial crisis. Japan’s negative attitude was reflected in a deep reluctance to yield its status 
as Asia’s special representative in the G7 group rather than enthusiasm about the new 
opportunity to elevate Asia’s role in global governance. To revitalize its economy Japan 
needs to play an active role in helping shape regional and global institutions and in engaging 
closely with China and India on the international dimensions of their ongoing reform.   
The 2000s saw the Japanese economy buoyed by the external sector, mainly a byproduct of 
China’s entry into the WTO. The Japanese economy enjoyed one of its longest economic 
expansions in the post war period in the first half of that decade. Yet that was achieved 
because business had focused on the opportunities in Asia that were created largely by 
China’s WTO accession. Japanese policy making not only lagged behind business but shut 
itself out of the main game decisively in the period 2001 to 2006 which saw relations with 
China turn unnecessarily sour and a suspension of leadership visits. The management of the 
baggage of political history with China continued to threaten to throw the development of the 
Japan-China relationship off course, although on the trade front there is little evidence that 
this has yet limited the expansion of trade and investment.59  
Trade and investment between Japan and China grew rapidly despite Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine  where 14 Class A war criminals are said 
to be enshrined  to honor Japan’s war dead. These visits caused diplomatic relations to fall 
to an all-time low since normalization in 1979. There is no clear explanation behind 
Koizumi’s actions, apart from narrow party political imperatives, since his diplomatic starting 
point was the promotion of China’s accommodation into the international system. Yet his 
action was symbolic of the inability of Japan’s policy leaders to guide Japan’s foreign 
economic policy toward a new strategy on China. At a time when China was changing the 
global economic and trading landscape, and opportunities were opening up in China with its 
accession to the WTO, Japan instead sought only trade agreements with smaller countries and 
avoided significant trade-policy-driven economic reform.    
The economic association with China is now a central element in Japan’s external economic 
relationships. There is a great reform still underway in China, likely next to encompass 
change of the financial markets, liberalization of payments and a new role for China in the 
international financial system. Given its proximity to development in China, Japanese 
business is an active beneficiary from China’s economic transformation  and the benefits of 
its already large dealings with and experience in China will only grow. The costs of Japan’s 
further distancing itself politically from China are immense.  
Early on, Japan played a crucial role in the development of production networks in East Asia 
and also played an active part in East Asian economic integration. Its location and 
circumstance suggest a significant role in the next phase of Asian growth and integration if it 
can relate successfully to a grand new vision of Asian trade and financial integration. This 
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new vision is likely to unfold around services, financial and capital account reform in China, 
the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community and the reinvigoration of reform in 
India. Japan has an integral role in this unfolding Asian drama. 
Throughout the 1990s but more so in the 2000s, Japanese government investment in 
infrastructure and connectivity in Southeast Asia and later South Asia began to make a 
significant contribution to bringing new countries into supply chains and creating 
opportunities in the region’s less developed economies. While the primary motivation was to 
assist Japanese multi-national enterprises (MNEs) in exporting equipment, machinery and 
engineering services across the region, and this was business- not government-led, this does 
not change the reality that the positive externalities of these activities are large. Japan’s 
policy leadership in precisely these connectivity-building dimensions of regional 
development is both an important public good and opportunity for national economic gain. 
What has been missing for Japan is the connection of those foreign economic policy 
strategies to domestic reforms. The Japanese economy needs deep structural reform; if this 
reform were done in tandem with an external economic strategy that brought South Asia into 
an integrated East Asia, the benefits would be compounded.  
Regional and global economic diplomacy 
What is obvious is that the global trade regime, rather than narrowly bilateral trade 
arrangements, has been crucial to the gains from growth through trade and investment 
between Japan and China.60 Beyond trade, Japan’s success in capturing the economic benefits 
from the relationship will also derive from an overarching strategy to manage and develop the 
increasingly important area of finance and investment relations within broader global and 
regional frameworks. Looking forward, on the trade and investment side, China is not a 
participant in the TPP and is unlikely to be one for the immediate future. This would suggest 
a rapid elevation of attention to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), 
in which China is a participant, and the entrenchment of RCEP in a broader framework for 
reform of global trade and economic governance.  
If Japan fails to reposition in its relations with China it is likely to be overwhelmed by a 
“reverse Nixon Shock” (the initiative that Nixon as US President took to open relations with 
China that blind-sided Japan). Japan is now open to being caught off guard again in China’s 
relations with the United States. China is already taking big initiatives in that relationship 
with its proposal for a Bilateral Investment Treaty and, more recently, discussion of a 
comprehensive FTA with the US.61 
Even if Japan commits to significant liberalization through the TPP, it will only deliver on a 
small part of the reform that is necessary for lifting growth potential in the Japanese 
economy. The value of the TPP for Japan lies in the symbolism that it might bring in the 
triumph of good economic policy over status quo vested interests, and as a signal that policy 
makers are willing to challenge vested interests. Agricultural reform is especially important 
to this symbolism of commitment to reform, though the overall economic gains from it will 
not be large. Services reform is more significant to overall economic performance, but much 
of the action has to be beyond TPP, domestically and perhaps through RCEP. Avoiding 
commitments in TPP or RCEP, and continuing the practice of traditional “trade-free 
agreements” will simply represent another major wasted opportunity. 
Another problem, of course, is that the global institutions, such as the GATT/WTO have 
weakened or become less relevant to the challenges that Japan now confronts. These 
institutions underpinned the heyday of Japan’s international economic diplomacy by 
providing an appropriate framework and set of principles to ensure success.  
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The international structural reforms that Japan needs to undertake are germane to the 
emerging agenda in the G20. Japan’s reluctance to embrace the G20 process fully, and 
especially to embrace the role of its Asian neighbors in the G20, means that it has not taken a 
forward position on reform of global governance in the areas of importance to Asia. G20 
efforts to rehabilitate the WTO by resuscitating the MFN principle and non-discriminatory 
liberalization and to refocus the WTO on issues related to structural reform could, if 
successful, help the Japanese economy in making this transition. Though there a few signs of 
it yet, it is to be hoped that the Japanese government will recognize its weakness and help 
push this agenda through the G20.  
Nor has Japan grasped the significance of the infrastructure investment agenda to regional 
growth objectives. Rather, its role in the G20 has been narrowly diplomatic in nature. 
Although this might be construed as central to managing Japan’s big economic and political 
partnerships in Asia, there appears little connection between the strategic coincidence of its 
interests in regional and global governance, and its participation in the APEC, ASEAN-based 
and G20 forums. The structural reform agenda has, over the past half-decade, become a focus 
of regional cooperation with APEC. But despite Japan’s role in founding APEC, it has not 
played an active role in framing the structural reform agenda in a way that would support its 
own domestic reform. This may be partly because of the shift to FTA diplomacy and partly 
because Japan has not embraced the structural reform agenda in APEC as its own. 
 
Conclusion 
In this context, it is correct to observe that Japan’s decline was in some sense a byproduct of 
Asia’s rise. Indeed, Asia’s rise, including that of China, presented an array of opportunities 
for Japan to ameliorate and forestall the effects of the demographic crunch and transition to 
economic maturity that it was fated to confront over these years. That China and the rest of 
Asia were opening up and achieving such sustained and remarkable growth, despite the 
hiccup of the Asian financial crisis, was a blessing that expanded Japanese economic frontiers 
and opportunities. Many of these opportunities were clearly seized. This was a period in 
which China become Japan’s largest trading partner, delivering both low-cost imports and 
export markets in China at scale. It was a period in which Japanese investment into China 
surged and output in Asia became a large share in the output of Japanese manufacturing 
corporations. These Japanese gains from Asia’s rise buttressed Japanese corporate 
competitiveness and strength. The regret, as we have seen, is that Japan could have made 
more of these opportunities: other countries in the region did. This is reflected in their relative 
economic performance compared with that of Japan, despite Japan’s handicap. And Japan’s 
failure to do better was not the result of business capacities or a culture that was not alive to 
new openings. Rather it was the product of a failure of government to reinvent policy strategy 
as the new circumstances demanded  a failure to make the right policy choice. In Shiraishi’s 
words, Japan’s instinct in foreign diplomacy was to think about what was all around it 
through the prism of “Japan and Asia,” and not “Japan in Asia.” In the end, that was as 
damaging to national economic policy outcomes as it was diminishing to Japan’s foreign 
diplomatic outcomes.  
The loss of coherence in international economic policy  connected at the hip to the absence 
of a long-term strategic vision about how to respond to national economic challenges  
distinguishes Japan’s past two “lost” decades from what went before. Getting the choices 
right going forward will depend on re-establishing the link between an international 
economic diplomacy that is connected to an agenda for national economic reform. This 
change will also demand that Japan more actively engage with China in Asia’s grand new set 
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of reforms. This strategy is essential to the next phase of Asian economic transformation 
through the “middle income trap.” Such moves demand new engagement at the global level, 
to strengthen and adapt the norms and rules for global economic governance that will be at 
the core of Japan’s potential prosperity in Asia in the years ahead.  
* We are most grateful to Son Chu for research and statistical assistance, to Ryan Manuel for comments on our 
draft, to Barak Kushner and Itō Kai for editorial input and to Funabashi Yōichi and our colleagues on this 




The following Appendix explains the calculations and definitions behind the analysis for 
Table 1.  
 
GDP growth and factor contributions  
 
The decomposition of GDP growth, which is used as an indicator of economic performance, 
is based on the growth accounting framework. Growth accounting has been one of the most 
popular approaches to understanding and measuring the sources of economic growth. In this 
framework, economic growth is considered to result from the expansion of input factors and 
the increased efficiency of using and combining these input factors to produce output. In the 
OECD productivity statistics, two key input factors are labor and capital. The efficiency of 
using input factors is measured by total factor productivity (TFP). GDP growth rate equals 
the sum of percentage contributions of labor and capital growth and TFP growth. The 
percentage contribution of each factor represents how many percentage points of GDP 
growth accounted were due to the growth of that factor. Usually, the percentage contribution 
of labor and capital growth is estimated first and then that of TFP growth. This means that the 
GDP growth rate due to TFP is the net of GDP growth rate after subtracting the GDP growth 
rates contributed by capital and labor growth. 
 
Labor productivity growth 
 
Labor productivity is a partial measure of productivity as it measures only the efficiency of 
labor. Labor productivity indicates how much output can be produced per one unit of labour 
input. Labor input is commonly measured in two ways. The first measure of labour input is 
the number of people employed or the employment level. The second measure is the total 
number of working hours (Coelli et al. 2005). While the latter is more appropriate than the 
previous former, it has more demanding data requirements (Asian Productivity Organization 
2013). The OECD productivity statistics provide both measures of labor input on Japan and 
selected OECD countries and is presented in Table 1.  
 
The use of two measures of labor productivity helps provide more information on economic 
performance and sheds light on the sources of economic growth. The difference between 
employment growth and the growth of total hours worked would indicate the relative 
contribution of labor force participation and the average working hours of an employed 
person to labor input growth. Furthermore, the difference in the two measures of labor 
productivity growth would suggest whether the change in labor productivity per person 
comes from working more or less hours. For example, GDP per employed person grew faster 
than GDP per hour worked in the United Kingdom and Italy for 1985-90. This would indicate 
each employed person worked longer hours in this period while employment growth and 
worked hours growth are the same. In contrast, an average employee worked less hours if 
output per person grew less than hourly output as seen in the United States in the 1985-90. 
Whatever the measure of labor productivity, the determinants of labor productivity are capital 
growth (capital deepening) and TFP growth, which includes the improvement in labor 







Trade and investment frontier models 
 
This study applies stochastic frontier analysis to the gravity model of trade as well as an FDI 
model (based on micro foundations from Baltagi et al (2007)) in order to construct trade and 
investment frontiers that can be used to estimate potential levels of trade and investment for 
each bilateral relationship globally. The method shifts the benchmark or counterfactual from 
being measured as the average of all characteristics of trade flows (which is what a 
conventional gravity and FDI models will produce) to an upper bound. The results are a 
single ratio for each trade relationship in each year. The stochastic method was developed to 
measure agricultural productivity, and separates out the effects of shocks such as drought or 
flood from the measure of efficiency (that is, actual to potential output) for that farm (Aigner 
et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). Unlike the results generated using a 
conventional gravity or FDI model, the addition of stochastic frontier analysis separates out 
the resistances unique to the bilateral relationship from other shocks to the global economic 
system.  
 
The use of the stochastic frontier gravity and FDI model results in measures of trade and FDI 
performance, which is actual trade as a ratio of potential trade, or actual investment as a ratio 
of potential investment. Potential trade or investment is estimated as the highest possible 
value– as if trade or FDI were occurring at the frontier – given the characteristics of the 
trading partners. In order to obtain accurate estimates of the influence of bilateral 
characteristics of countries on trade and investment, and of third-party country effects, world 
trade and investment frontiers are estimated using a matrix of global trade and investment 
flows.  
 
Specification of the stochastic frontier gravity model of trade with trade inefficiency 
determinants 
 
The model here follows closely that of Armstrong (2012a) and is based on combining the 
gravity model of trade with stochastic frontier analysis. The stochastic frontier gravity model 
of trade is defined as  
 
ln Xijt (IMijt )  0  1 lnYit  2 lnYjt  3 ln Distij  4 trend  vijt  uijt (1) 
 
where Xijt (IMijt ) are the volume of exports (imports) between country i (reporter) and 
country j (partner), Yi and Yj are GDP of countries i and j as economic mass variables, Distij 
represents distance between two trading partners, and trend accounts for changes in trade 
potential between them, vijt  is the random error term and uijt is the one-sided non-negative 
random variable. By construction, the term uijt is defined as trade inefficiency effects, which 
cause actual bilateral trade between two trading partners to deviate from their trade potential 
level. Trade inefficiency is assumed to consist of a function of natural and socio-economic 
factors and policy variables presented by the trade inefficiency model. For further 
explanation, see Armstrong (2007).  
 
Inefficiency effect model: 
 
ijt 0 1contigij 2comlangij 3 ln Rit 4 ln Rjt
5ANDEAN 6ASEAN 7APEC 8EU 9MERCOSUR10NAFTAijt (2) 
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These empirical models are estimated using the estimation procedure recently developed by 
Belotti et al. (2012) that is based on the STATA program and the estimation procedure uses 
the maximum likelihood estimation method. The parameters of the stochastic trade frontier 
trade and trade inefficiency models are simultaneously estimated for all countries with both 
positive import and export flows with their trading partners.  
 
The model is estimated for 177 of the largest exporters and importers globally for the period 
2000-2011 and consequently, the estimated trade frontier model presents a world trade 
frontier. Trade data are from the United Nations COMTRADE database. Trade data include 
export and import data for all countries of interest in current USD. Data on GDP and GDP 
per capita as well as simple average tariff rate are obtained from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators database (WDI). Finally, data on bilateral geographical distances, 
common borders (contigij), and common languages (commlangij) are extracted from the 
database of French Institute for Research on the International Economy (CEPII). The bilateral 
geographical distance used in this study is the great-circle distance between major cities of 
each economy. Data on various free trade agreements (FTAs) are created using information 
on country membership available on the Wikipedia website. 
 
Alternative hypotheses were tested to justify the use of a stochastic frontier approach to 
measuring and modeling trade flows with the estimation of trade friction effects. Generalized 
likelihood ratio (LR) tests are carried out and confirm the functional form and specification 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995).  
 
Frontier models with sfpanel in STATA 
     
Variables IMPORT FLOWS EXPORT FLOWS 
Coefficient Standard errors Coefficient Standard errors 
Trade Frontier             
lngdpi 0.828*** (0.00) 0.996*** (0.00) 
lngdpj 0.963*** (0.00) 0.794*** (0.00) 
lndistw -1.014*** (0.01) -1.168*** (0.01) 
trend -0.069*** (0.00) -0.061*** (0.00) 
Constant -24.347*** (0.10) -23.439*** (0.10) 
Inefficiency Effects Model 
contig -15.244*** (0.76) -25.304*** (1.43) 
comlang -4.843*** (0.16) -6.388*** (0.22) 
lnRi 0.220*** (0.04) 1.633*** (0.06) 
lnRj 1.439*** (0.06) -0.053 (0.05) 
ANDEAN -30.266*** (8.12) -28.892*** (7.80) 
ASEAN -2.962** (1.35) -15.285*** (4.02) 
APEC -43.929*** (2.19) -35.344*** (2.05) 
EU -10.864*** (0.56) -9.185*** (0.52) 
MERCOSUR -32.354*** (8.97) -23.329*** (7.42) 
NAFTA -3.779 (18.39) 9.478 (13.23) 
Constant -1.063*** (0.23) -1.831*** (0.24) 
Usigma 2.939*** (0.02) 2.818*** (0.02) 
Vsigma 0.539*** (0.01) 0.617*** (0.01) 
N 146942  146942             
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Stochastic frontier analysis applied to an FDI model  
The investment frontier model used in this study follows closely that of Armstrong (2011) 
and Dee (2007) which is based on Baltagi et al. (2007). The model is as follows: 
 
 
 (1)    Ft = β0 + β1dist + β2Gt + β3St + β4kt + β5nt + β6ht + β7lt + β8Γt + β9Θt + β10FTAt 
+ β11WGt + β12WSt + β13Wkt + β14Wnt + β15Wht + β16Wlt + β17WΓt  
+ β18WΘt + β19WFTAt + vt + ut       
  
Where 
Ft is the log of FDI (for FDI stock – FDI flows are also tested) 
dist is the log of the great circle distance between capital cities of d and i. 
Gt is the log of the sum of country d (source country) and country i (destination or host 
country) GDPs: ln(GDPd + GDPi) 
St is a measure of GDP similarity: (1 – sd2 – si2)  
where sd = GDPd /(GDPd + GDPi) and si = GDPi /(GDPd + GDPi) 
kt is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country capital stock: ln(Kd/Ki) 
ht is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country human capital: ln(Hd/Hi) 
lt is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country unskilled labour: ln(Ld/Li) 
nt is the log of the ration of source country to destination country natural resource 
endowment: ln(Nd/Ni) 
Γt is an interaction term between Gt and kt: Gt kt 
Θt is an interaction term between distance and the difference in capital and labour ratios:  
 dis(kt – lt) 
FTAt is a variable that takes the value of one if country d and i have a free trade agreement in 
force in year t.  
W is a measure of multilateral effects interacted with each term. WGt, for example, is the 
inverse distance weighted average of Gt between the source country and all third country 
markets.  
vt is an independently and identically distributed normal residual term that captures the usual 
model disturbance from measurement error and other shocks that are no associated with 
resistances to FDI.  
ut is an independently and identically distributed non-negative variable that captures the 





Estimation Results of FDI frontier models with OECD data 
	
Coefficient estimates for frontier 
estimation  
 FDI frontier inefficiency effect 
model
        
lndistw   -0.838***   colony  -5.924*** 
   (0.02)     (1.32) 
G   1.375***   comlan  -10.145***   
   (0.02)     (2.12) 
St   1.406***   contig  -3.860*** 
   (0.08)     (0.92) 
Kt   -3.231***   Constant  -2.131** 
   (0.27)     (1.01) 
Ht1   -0.093***   Usigma  2.575*** 
   (0.03)     (0.13) 
Lt1   1.180***   Vsigma  0.659*** 
   (0.15)     (0.05) 
Nt1   -0.076***      
   (0.01)   Number of obs  13385 
Gamma   0.091***      
   (0.01)      
Phi1 (2,3)   0.080***   
   (0.02)   
WGt   3.443***   
   (0.20)   
WSt   -241.964***   
   (14.51)   
WKt   -251.831***   
   (43.98)   
WHt1(2,3)   32.207***   
   (3.24)   
WLt1(2,3)   481.460***   
   (21.12)   
WNt1(2,3)   -6.824***   
   (1.65)   
WGamt   -12.213***   
   (1.53)   
WPhi   95.744***   
   (2.99)   
Constant   -24.239***   
   (0.64)   
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